We consider an oligopoly of firms that compete on price. Firms produce a non-stochastic output, insurance coverage, which is sold before the true cost is known. They behave as if they were risk-averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game. At stage 1, each firm chooses its internal capital level. At stage 2, firms compete on price. We characterize the conditions for Nash equilibria and analyze the strategic impact of capital choice on the market. We discuss the model with regard to insurance industry specificity and regulation.
Introduction
This article presents a model of capital choice for insurance rms with costly external nance in an oligopoly setting. Determining the appropriate levels of capital holding and investment in risk management is a major component of insurers and reinsurers' activities, as well as a prominent regulatory issue. Due to the trend towards consolidation of the last two decades, insurance market are far from being perfectly competitive. In the context of imperfect competition, rms' price and capital decisions can be expected to become strategic variables. This leads to consider the question of capital regulation with a dierent perspective. Price regulation is something dicult to put in place on the insurance market except through discrimination exclusion. However, in a market where capital choice and solvability are crucial and where cycles linking prices and capital are observed empirically, it is useful to understand how capital decisions are impacted by imperfect competition.
There are two fundamental reasons for an insurance rm to invest in risk management and costly capital holding. The rst one is the concern for quality. The nature of the insurance contract is essentially a promise to deliver indemnities ex-post in some states of Nature in exchange for a premium paid in advance. The credibility of such promise is a major preoccupation of policyholders. A contract with non-zero default risk has a lower value for the policyholder than a fully credible contract, so consumers have a lower propensity to pay for it. Hence prot-maximizing insurance rms have a rationale to reduce the probability of default when consumers are aware and sensitive to it, by investing in risk management activities, and/or holding a sucient level of capital that plays the role of a buer stock. This aspect refers to the solvency issue (Zanjani, 2002; Rees et al., 1999) . The second explanation relies on direct statecontingent costs that make the rms' payos becoming non-linear and so justify the use of risk management and capital holding strategies, even if shareholders-managers, considered as the same entity, are risk neutral. These non-linearities may include i. the presence of convex taxes on corporate earnings, ii. nancial distress costs, iii. costly external funds due to costly state verication (Gollier, 2007; Froot et al., 1993) 1 . These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and give so many reasons for insurance and reinsurance rms to reinsure themselves, hedge, manage risks and participate in insurance pools (Froot, 2007) . In a recent paper, Froot (2007) analyses risk management decisions for an insurance rm, as well as its capital budgeting and structure decisions, illustrating the trade-o between holding more internal costly initial capital and limiting risk aversion thanks to a higher level of internal funds.
If such rationales for risk management and capital holding by insurers and reinsurers are well understood (at least theoretically), less is known about how these decisions operate in the strategic context of imperfect competition. This lack of interest may 1 Note that there is also a theoretical explanation that, on the contrary, supports the assumption of risk-loving behavior of rms: limited liability, in a context of agency problems between creditors, who bear the cost of distress if it occurs, and owners, who get the benets as long as they exist, but are protected by a limited liability constraint if the rm goes bankrupt.
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come from the fact that insurance markets are usually considered to be competitive.
Although this assumption is well-documented, there are also arguments in favour of imperfect competition as a more appropriate framework in the cases of specialized insurance companies (Nye and Hoander, 1987) and the reinsurance sector (Gron, 1990) . Moreover, since the insurance premiums are partly determined by the prices and capacities of reinsurance market, the degree of competition in the reinsurance sector does matter for the insurance one. Intuitively, the introduction of imperfect competition may have consequences on pricing and capital decisions: when rms compete strategically in an oligopolistic market, risk management decisions may be distorted by strategic eects. These distortions may in turn aect insurance supply decisions, that is which lines of risks to cover and at which unit price. More capitalized rms would be able to accept more risks, and so capital holding could increase their market shares on lines of risks that are characterized by high aggregate uncertainty.
The purpose of this paper is to study the endogenous choice of capital holding and pricing decisions for an oligopoly of (re)insurance rms that face costly external nance. We build on Froot et al. (1993) , which provides one of the canonical explanations for rms' risk management based on the assumption that internal capital is less costly than external capital. We consider a price competition setting similar to Wambach (1999) . Indeed argued by Rees et al. (1999) , price competition seems more natural than quantity competition if rationing the supply is dicult once the price of the product has been posted (Vives, 1999) , as it is the case in the insurance sector. In the model, the number of insurers is exogenous. Insurers cover a single line of risk which is characterized by aggregate uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty on the level of the aggregate expected loss 2 . This uncertainty may arise from correlated risks across policyholders, a typical feature of natural disaster risks, such as earthquake, drought etc. Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as knightian uncertainty; this is typically characteristic of new technological risks, for which the probability distribution cannot be derived from past observations. In this framework, we analyze the strategic choice of capital for insurance rms. Under imperfect competition, holding more capital reduces the cost of risk for rms but has also consequences on competition through the rms' price-setting game. As in Wambach (1999) , we obtain a continuum of Nash equilibrium prices, allowing for positive oligopolistic rents. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, we nd that the choice of capital is strategic for the rms as playing safer on the capital market induces a harsher behavior on the product market. We underline the importance of the cost of capital in the insurance industry outcomes. Finally, we propose a dierent approach to the question of capital regulation, complementary to the classical quality argument (Plantin and Rochet, 2007) : required levels of capital may have an impact on 2 When risks are statistically independent across policyholders, risk management and capital budgeting decisions are still an issue since the probability of default is never null, but it is clear that the problem becomes more stringent when there is aggregate uncertainty about the expected prot from a line of risk. Related literature . Polborn (1998) and Wambach (1999) consider an oligopoly of n rms with risk-averse managers, producing a single output. Marginal cost is constant but stochastic. Firms commit to the price of the output before the marginal cost is revealed, and then serve the whole demand they face at the committed price, which is typically the Bertrand assumption. Such assumptions appear to t very well with the insurance and reinsurance markets where the cost of a given line of (re)insurance is not known with certainty at the time contracts are sold, i.e. the production cycle is reversed. In such setting, they nd that the Bertrand paradox (Tirole, 1988 ) -i.e. the fact that at least two competitors are sucient to restore the competitive price outcome-can be resolved 3 in the sense that there exists Nash price equilibria above the expected marginal cost, which lead to strictly positive oligopolistic rents. There are also multiple equilibria (Wambach, 1999) due to a trade-o between expected prot and risk for each of the competing rms. Asplund (2002) generalizes the analysis to complementary or substitute strategies and takes into account the possible covariations across rms' individual risks. He also notes the importance of initial wealth and xed cost on the resulting Nash equilibria when rms display decreasing absolute risk aversion. Duncan and Myers (2000) consider the same kind of model but allow for free entry, so the number of insurers that serve the market is endogenous and depends on their reservation utility, which is assumed exogenous. Because of rms' risk aversion in presence of catastrophic and correlated risks, insurance supply that emerges at the equilibrium is rationed. Froot and O'Connell (2008) also introduce imperfect competition in an oligopoly of n risk averse insurers with correlated portfolios and a risk-averse representative reinsurer that pools insurers' risks, in a context of Cournot competition. They suggest that imperfect competition tends to reinforce the overpricing of correlated risks when compared to the fair price.
Our paper can also be related to a strand of literature derived from Brander and Lewis (1986) , that analyzes the strategic value of debt emission for rms in oligopoly markets. In particular, the timing is similar, with two-periods models where nancial decisions are taken at stage 1 and productions decisions at stage 2. The strategic value of debt holding depends on the type of uncertainty faced by the marketdemand or cost -and the type of competition (Wanzenried, 2003) . We depart here from this literature as we focus on the impact of risk aversion on the choice of ex-ante equity capital, from the investor's point of view: risk aversion enhances the weight of high cost states, rendering capital level a strategic choice as it modies the price equilibria.
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 lays out the competition game; Section 3 and 4 derives the results on the impact of capital holding on the competitive structure of the market; Section 5 looks at the social welfare and capital regulation. Section 6 discusses these results in line with the insurance industry specicities and concludes.
2 The model
The oligopoly market
We consider an oligopoly of n insurance rms, indexed by i = 1...n, that produce the same non-dierentiated single good q i that can be thought of as a quantity of insurance coverage sold to a continuum of risk-averse insureds. The aggregate demand for coverage is exogenous, non-stochastic, and dened by Q(p) when all insurance companies charge the same price p. Q(p) is continuous, decreasing in p and lim
Because of the inversion of the production cycle, insurance rms do not know exante the exact cost of supplying such coverage 4 . Let us denoteL i ∈ [0, L max ] the stochastic loss per unit of output (or coverage) q i sold by the rm i. We noteL i = EL i . Cost uncertainty may be particularly relevant in (re)insurance markets where individual risks exhibit positive correlations which is a typical feature of catastrophic risks. Alternatively, cost uncertainty may also reect the imperfect knowledge of the "true" probability distribution of the loss, due to a lack of data, a situation that is typical of new technological risks, or natural disaster risks. Because of cost uncertainty, the prot from exerting the insurance activity is stochastic. For a rm i and a given price p, let us deneπ i (p, q i ) as follows
wherem i = p −L i is the stochastic unit margin. When the insurance coverage is fairly priced, i.e. p −L i = 0 and the insurance activity entails no transaction costs, the rm i's expected prot is equal to zero, as in the standard competitive model with risk neutral insurers. If, due to market power, the per unit price is strictly above the expected loss per unit, i.e. p −L i > 0, then increasing supply q i (via increasing market-share) increases the expected prot of the rm, but also makes prot riskier.
This is the fundamental trade-o that will be at the heart of the following analysis.
To keep things simple, we will consider that the lossL per unit of output is the same for all insurance rms. Whether they are correlated or not is not important in our framework, since coverage is sold before the true realization of losses.
Firms' objectives
The managers are supposed to maximize the value of the rm. Following Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (Froot et al., 1993) , such objective may lead to an apparent 4 This cost can be approximated by the expected loss plus a loading factor that covers a set of various transaction costs (administrative costs, ambiguity aversion, security margin and so on).
Even in situations where the law of large numbers applies well, the cost of a given insured risk remains fundamentally stochastic.
risk-averse behavior when external sources of nance are more costly than internal ones. Let us recall their model. The rm faces a two-period investment and nancing choice. The investment requires an expenditure I and has a net return F (I) = f (I) − I, where f is an increasing and concave function. This investment may be nanced through the rm's internal assets w as well as through external capital e acquired at a cost c(e). The problem for rms is that there are dead weight costs of raising such external nance, due to several reasons including distress costs and informational asymmetries as argued in Froot et al. (1993) . Formally, these dead weight costs are captured by the fact that c(.) is convex. The solution of the investment/nancing problem is given by
s.t. I = w + e
The value of the rm, denoted P (w) is the maximand of the programme. By analogy with the usual denition of the risk premium (Gollier, 2001) , with the dierence that the function P (.) replaces the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.), Let R(W 0 ,x) be given by
where W 0 is the level of initial wealth andx a zero mean risk . Here, the rm i is endowed with an initial level of capital w i . She covers an amount of risk q i of uncertain lossL, at price p. Her nal wealth isW i = w i + (p −L)q i . We notē W = EW i . The 0-mean risk to which it is exposed is : (L − EL)q i . For notational simplicity, we note the risk premium R i (W i , q i ) and we have:
We make the following assumptions :
• (A1) ∂P ∂w ≥ 1 and
The prot maximizing output of the rms increases when the price increases.
The following comments are in order. (A1) follows from the concavity of f and convexity of c. This is just a consequence of the envelop theorem (Froot et al., 1993 
• At stage 2: Each rm posts its own price and commits to sell any quantity at this price.
At stage 1, rms choose their additional capital level K by maximizing the expected net value:
The capital has an opportunity cost, τ K, for the investors where 0 ≤ τ . At stage 2, a price competition, in the same manner as in Wambach (1999) , takes place between the n value-maximizing rms. Firms compete on price before the true cost is revealed by Nature: the rm with the lowest price catch all the market, and must serve all the demand that it faces; if more than one rm set the same lowest price, the market is shared equally among them. Finally, the state of Nature is realized: losses are revealed. The rms realize their investments choices, raising if needed additional ex-post external capital. 
Symmetric rms
Suppose that at the beginning of stage 2, rms have the same level of internal capital, that is for all i, j, i = j, w i 1 = w j 1 . The functions P i (.) are supposed identical and will be by now denoted P (.). We have
where
is the expected prot of rm i. p is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if rms can not increase their value by undercutting price. Formally
or, using the risk premium formulation
Consider that rms have an outside option that gives them an expected value equal to V out ≥ 0, which is assumed exogenous.
Denition 1. We note p out the price for which the rms are indierent between serving 1/nth of the market or their outside option V out
The following proposition, extending Wambach (1999)'s characterizes the Nash equilibria of the price competition Proposition 1. In the case of symmetric rms, under (A1), (A3) and (A4) a) there exists a continuum P N E = [p out , p N ] of Nash equilibrium prices p ∈ P N E , where p N is dened by
b) the maximum Nash price p N is higher than the competitive price, lower than the maximum monopoly price when it exists, and provides a value of the rm higher than her outside option.
Proof : see appendix.
The fact that price competition across risk-averse rms leads to multiple equilibria has already been exhibited by Polborn (1998) and Wambach (1999) . It has a strong link with the standard price competition literature when rms exhibit decreasing returns to scale 5 . When price is higher than expected cost, cutting price increases 5 This result has in fact an intuitive explanation: for some values of price, a slight price cut allows a rm to catch all the market, which increases its revenue. But at the same time the rm is committed to serve the whole demand (which is moreover slightly higher due to the price cut), exposing it to higher values of marginal cost and so a higher average cost of production. For low enough output price, catching the whole market could then reduce the value of the rm.
7 the expected prot of the rm that makes a unilateral deviation, but also exposes it to the increased cost of risk that arises from serving the whole market. For some values of price, the cost for the rms of being exposed to more risk can be greater than the expected gain from catching the whole market. In the present case, to the fundamental trade-o between expected prot and risk exposure must be added a wealth-eect term which comes from the fact that the cost of bearing risk itself is a function of the value of expected prot.
This three-terms trade-o can be represented graphically. To keep things simple, let us consider the case of a perfectly inelastic demand equal to Q. Let s i = q i /Q denote the market share of rm i. Serving more customers exposes the rms to a greater share of cost uncertainty, at an increasing rate. In Figure 2 , both expected prot and pseudo risk premium curves are drawn as a function of the market share in the case in the case of two rms and for two (not necessarily Nash equilibria)
prices: p 0 (thin line) and p 1 (thick line), with p 0 < p 1 . There are essentially two values of interest for the market share: Q/2 and Q. For a given price p, the expected prot of rm i,
, is a linear function of the market share. The certainty equivalent of rm's wealth is simply the dierence between the expected prot and the risk premium, which is represented by the vertical arrows. As a preliminary, let us consider the eect of a price increase from p 0 to p 1 . For all market shares, the prots will be higher for p 1 than for p 0 . But the risk premium is lower because of the wealth eect: a higher expected price leads to a higher expected prot, and so a higher nal wealth of the rm. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, this tends to decrease the rm's sensitivity to risk. Hence, for a given market share, an increase in price tends to increase the dierence between the expected prot and the risk premium.
Let us identify the Nash Equilibrium prices. Start at price p 1 . At this price each rm has an incentive to slightly decreases its price in order to catch the whole market. The price cut simultaneously decreases the slope of the expected prot line and increases those of the risk premium, so the two curves are getting nearer, as a scissorclosing movement. As the increase in expected prot more than compensates the increase in pseudo risk premium, price cutting is the optimal strategy. Symmetric rms cut prices up to a certain level. In our gure, at p 0 , rms' value are equal at Q/2 and Q.
If one rm slightly cut its price, the increase in expected prot that it would get from catching the whole market is inferior to the loss due to the increase in risk premium.
So when the indierence price, p N in our formal analysis, is attained, no rm has an incentive to cut its price anymore. It is graphically straightforward that this price is not the single Nash Equilibrium. As long as rms get as much as their outside option, the rms participate to the market. Every price between the outside option price and the indierence price is a Nash equilibrium, since no rm has neither an incentive to slightly increase its price (its demand would be zero) nor to decrease it (the subsequent increase in risk would decrease the value of the rm).
To characterize how internal capital impacts the maximum Nash price, we consider here an assumption which is slightly stronger than DARA. Let us denote
and assume that
• (A5) ∆R increases in w.
With DARA (A2) only, the global eect of a multiplicative risk on the risk premium is ambiguous in general. This is link to a double eect: an increase of market share corresponds to 1. an increase in endowment decreasing the risk premium through the DARA hypothesis 2. an increase in risk, increasing the risk premium through the risk aversion hypothesis. (A5) states that prices are in a region were the risk eect is amplied by the wealth eect: the more capitalised rms are less reluctant to serve higher demand -and hold more risk-. This assumption leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. For symmetric rms, under assumptions (A1) to (A5),
Thus when the level of rms' internal capital is high, i.e. rms are less risk averse, the competitive pressure they can exert is then high, and leads to a lower the maximum Nash price. 
Asymmetric rms
Let us consider the asymmetric continuation equilibrium where rms enter stage 2 with dierent levels of capital. It is important to consider the asymmetric equilibrium of stage 2 since capital is the strategic variable at the rst stage, and we should be able to describe how unilateral deviations modify the outcome of the game. We consider the case of an oligopoly of rms i = 1...n: w n 1 > w i 1 > w 1
1 . Under DARA, dierence in the level of available capital lead to dierences in the degree of risk aversion, which impact the price competition game. The less risk averse rm is the rm with the higher initial capital, that is rm n.
Denition 2. We consider an oligopoly of n risk averse rms. We note p out max the maximum of the prices for which the rms are indierent between serving 1/nth of the market or their outside option V out
Hence we can state the following proposition, focusing on n-oligopoly prices, that is the case where p out max < p N min Proposition 2. In the case of asymmetric rms, under (A1) to (A5), if p out max < p N min : a) There exists a continuum P N E = [p out max , p N min ] of Nash equilibrium prices p ∈ P N E for the n-oligopoly, where p N min is dened as
b) The maximum Nash price p N min corresponds to the indierence price for the less risk averse rm between serving the whole market and serving 1/nth of it. p N min is higher than the competitive price, lower than the maximum monopoly price when it exists, and provides a value of the rm higher than her outside option.
Note that in the case where p out max > p N min , the dierence between the rms initial capital is such that the competitive pressure exerted by the less risk averse rms i leads to a situation where the more risk averse rm can not aord to stay in the market at such price. But the other rms i can then still sustain the risk of all the market.
An equilibrium can be reach with asymmetrically capitalised rms. The less capitalised the rm, the less oligopolistic rent it can extract. This leads to a situation where the market is divided between less rms. Other Nash equilibria may be obtained in the case where p out max < p N min , with less than n rms (see appendix). A graphical explanation may give the intuition of the proof. For a same level of coverage of the market, the risk premium of rm i R i is higher than rm j's risk premium R j . As in the symmetric case, the case of inelastic demand is considered. As rm i is more risk averse than rm j, p N i > p N j . We focus on the case where p out max < p N min . For all p > p N i , both rms prefer serving the whole market and thus may deviate from price to conquer it; p N i ≥ p > p N j rm j prefers the whole market and thus will lower the price to conquer it; if p = p N j , then rm j is indierent between serving the whole market or half of it, and rm i prefers serving half of it, thus p N j is a Nash equilibrium price. Thus, with a similar argument than in the symmetric case, for p N j ≥ p ≥ p out max there is a Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates this case. Both rms share the same expected prots. The risk premium curves correspond for each rm to the risk premium value for their indierence prices. As rm i's risk premium curves is always higher than rm j's. We can graphically see that the indierence price for rm i is higher than for rm j. Thus, we have shown that in the case of a duopoly of asymmetric DARA rms, there exists a continuum of Nash equilibrium prices p. The higher Nash equilibrium price p N j corresponds to the indierence price for the less risk averse rm, between serving the whole market and serving only one half of it.
3.3 Selecting a unique equilibrium price
The existence of multiple equilibrium prices raises the question of their selection.
This is especially important in our two-stage setting since the anticipated Nash equilibrium price will be determinant for rms Another argument also pleads for the selection of the highest price. Intuition suggests that high equilibrium prices are more likely to deter collusion, since they let rms with high oligopolistic rents and so reduce the size of punishment if a price war occurs after some rms break the collusive agreement. Formally, let us consider a collusive price p C strictly above the maximum Nash equilibrium price, i.e. p C > p N . Suppose that the n rms are identical with each rm's expected value written as V (p, n) for a given price p when the n rms share the market equally. Let δ be the discount factor, identical among rms, and T the number of periods over which collusion is supposed to take place. Under collusion, each rm gets
If a rm slightly undercuts the price to p C − , it get V (p C − , 1) in the rst period, which is higher than V (p C , n) for an is close to zero. But such unilateral deviation triggers a price war that leads to V (p N E , n) in the following periods, with p N E ∈ P N E . Hence, rms will stick to the collusive price if
Strict equality denes a threshold δ lim above which collusion occurs. For T = +∞, this threshold is equal to
Since V (p N E , n) strictly increases with p N E , δ lim increases with p N E . Hence the intuition that collusion is less likely to occur for higher equilibrium prices is veried.
In this sense, the highest Nash equilibrium price p N can be selected as the more robust to collusion. In the following section, in which stage 1 choice of capital is characterized, rms will be assumed to anticipate this p N as the outcome of price competition without any uncertainty. while the competitors take the price as given, one must distinguish price-making and price-taking rms when studying the consequences of marginal deviations. The price-making rms take into account the strategic, product-market eect of their internal capital when choosing it, while price-taking rms do not. We dene the objective function of the rms below.
Denition 3. The value of the rm net of capital, V i (.), is dened as follows 8
Depending on the status of the rm (price taking or price making), the behaviour of the function is quite dierent. For a rm where K i = K the anticipated Nash price is a function of K i . Otherwise, the anticipated Nash price only depends on an exogenousK . Such formal clarication being made, we are now able to study the stage 1 subgame in more depth. The rst step is to characterize the behavior of V i (.), and the sign of a marginal deviation, in the symmetric case.
a) Marginal deviation of a price-taking rm
For a price-taking rm, K = max[K 1 , ..., K n ] ≥ K i . In the symmetric case, we are looking at the sign of the rst order derivative of V i , for an exogenous price equal to
The rst-order derivative formalizes the trade-o between the marginal cost of capital, M C direct , and the marginal benet of reducing the cost of risk for the rm, MB. If capital is not costly to hold, i.e. τ = 0, the rst-order derivative becomes
(1 − R 1 )P w − 1 which is always positive since by assumption R 1 ≤ 0 and P w ≥ 1.
b) Marginal deviation of a price-making rm
For a price-making rm, 
When the rm i is the most capitalized, it has to take into account the strategic eect due to product market competition M C strategic in addition to the direct costof-risk reduction incentive M B and the marginal direct cost M C direct in its capital budgeting decision. This strategic eect represents a cost, since increasing internal capital reduces the market price set at stage 2 (Lemma 1). It is decomposed into two distinct terms that correspond to the following eects. The rst one, strategic wealth eect, is equal to
Indeed because of increased competitive pressure, the increase in expected nal wealth due to more capital is partly counterbalanced by lower expected prots. If the price-making rm i chooses its capital in a naive way, i.e. without considering this eect, it would overvalue its expected nal wealth, and so the real cost of risk in its capital budgeting decision. The second term that we name strategic demand eect is equal to
It is null when the demand is price-inelastic. By lowering the market price, a marginal increase in capital commits each rm to serve a higher demand, and so exposes them to a higher level of risk.
c) Assumption of concavity
The question of the sign of both marginal deviations is important to understand the trade-o of the players. We make the two following assumptions and dene in the following manner the levels of external capital K * and K + 
Following the previous discussion, we place ourselves under assumption (A6) in the case of a symmetric oligopoly of n rms, characterized by their initial wealth w 0 . Since rms are perfectly symmetric, for all i, j K i * = K j * = K * and K i+ = K j+ = K + . We have the following proposition Proposition 3. Under assumptions (A1) to (A6), if w 1 0 = ... = w n 0 = w 0 , there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria
Proof : see appendix. correspond to the marginal net value of an increase of capital for a price-making rm, whereas the left-hand arrows show the marginal net value of a decrease of capital, for price-taking rm. When K < K * , a rm has no incentives to decrease capital as the marginal net value of being the follower is negative, whereas the marginal net value of increasing capital and being leader is positive. Thus it is driven to K = K * . For all K between K * and K + , the rm has no interest in increasing nor lowering its capital level as both would induce a lower net benet (as taker or leader). For K higher than K + however, there is no incentive for the rm to increase capital, but as a follower it has an interest in lowering her capital level as marginal net value for 15 holding one more units of capital is too low compared to the cost of holding it. This leads to a continuum of Nash Equilibrium of which one can select the set leading to the higher rm's value as in the case of the equilibrium price.
The case of asymmetric rms follows simply. To grasp the intuition of the game, consider 2 rms l respectively h, with a low, respectively high, level of initial capital: w l 0 < w h 0 . First note that if assumption (A6a) holds for V lLeader , it holds for V hLeader (see appendix E). The rm with the lowest level of initial capital is the more risk averse. To have the same level of risk aversion, rm l has to hold much more costly capital than rm h. As the cost of capital is linear, they will both obtain their maximal net value for the same level of wealthw = w l 0 + K * l = w h 0 + K * h . As long as rm l does not have the same amount of wealth as rm h, it has interest to hold the same total of capital, up to K + , level at which it is to costly to hold capital. This leads to the following Proposition Proposition 4. Under assumptions (A1) to (A6), if w 1 0 < ... < w n 0 , there exists a continuum of Nash equilibria (K 1 , ..., K n ), where ∀ i < n, K i = K * 1 + w 1 − w i , and
For reasons similar to those developed to select the Nash equilibrium price, we focus on the level of capital that maximizes rm's net value. Due to its implicit denition, K * depends on the initial level of capital w 0 . Intuitively a high level of initial capital could lead to a Nash equilibrium of no additional capital. Following Proposition 3, we can show that in this case, that is when V i (0) > 0, K = 0 is a Nash equilibria.
e) Analysis of the results
The model provides a framework with an endogenous choice of capital that accounts for specicities of the insurance market. It enhances the strategic role of capital in the product market competition of insurance rms. Indeed, rms have two dierent ways to manage risks. The rst one is by acquiring more capital at rst stage to lower their risk premium. The second one is by setting a higher price everything else being equal at the second stage. Both ways to hedge interact in a price competition setting.
Indeed the opportunity cost of capital limits the amount of capital an insurance company may hold before subscription. A higher level of capital however induces a decrease in insurers' cost of risk. This allows for a more aggressive attitude on the market, a decrease in their equilibrium prices and thus an increase in the quantity insurers deliver. Thus the level of capital is limited by its strategic cost in addition to the cost of holding it.
The model allows for a double set of continuum of equilibrium : continuum of equilibrium prices at a xed capacity, and continuum of sets of capital choices, when anticipating the maximum Nash Price p N . Following the arguments developed previously we focus on the equilibrium extracting the highest rents for the rms, that is the set of K * and the equilibrium price p N . Corollary 1. In the preceding framework, following a symmetric negative shock on initial wealth level, prices rise and global market capacity decreases. The same results hold in the case of a positive shock on the cost of capital.
Proof : The concavity of function V i (.) leads to the result, derived from Proposition 3.
This result is interesting for the study of cycles. A high cost event in an industry with uncertainty on costs leads to a decrease of the capital available. In our framework, a lower initial capital leads to a lower level of capital (initial and external) at the end of Stage 1, due to the cost of additional capital. The higher resulting price on the product market leads in the case of an elastic demand to a contraction of the industry's global capacity.
Note that in the preceding symmetric framework, a higher cost of capital leads to higher prices on the product market as capital is more costly to hold, and thus a contraction of the quantity supplied to the market in the case of elastic demand. An Corollary 2. Consider the n-rms oligopoly with k ≤ n identical rms having a higher level of internal capital than the n − k other rms. Under assumptions (A1) to (A5), p N decreases with k.
Let us rst focus on the impact on the equilibrium price for a xed level of capital w 1 .
As the number of identical, best capitalized rms increases, the trade-o between serving the whole market and a fraction 1/n of it is clearly modied. On the one hand, when n becomes large, the risk from serving 1/n becomes smaller, whereas the risk associated with serving the whole market is unchanged. Thus the dierence in terms of risk premium increases between the two options. This tends to incite rms to keep on serving a share 1/n of the market. On the other hand, from an expected prot perspective, the incentive to cut price clearly increases when n increases, since expected prots are multiplied by n for a rm which would follow such strategy. Under Assumptions (A1) to (A5), this trade-o is no longer ambiguous. The graphical intuition of the result is quite intuitive. Figure 5 illustrates this proposition in the case of inelastic demand. An increase in the number of reinsurer, for the same price, diminishes the surplus of the rm, as the quantity of the market served by the rm is lessened (from 1/n th to 1/n + 1 th ). Due to the scissors eect described previously, the maximum Nash equilibrium price p N n+1 for a market with n + 1 rms is below the maximum Nash equilibrium price p N n for a market with n rms. Thus, the higher the number of less risk averse rms, the lower the market price.
f) Monopoly case
As an extreme case, we consider the monopoly case. At stage 2, the monopolistic rm is characterised by an initial wealth w 0 + K. The monopolistic price, noted p M , is the classical solution of expected value maximization, and veries p M > p N (K).
Note that the monopolistic price is a decreasing function of the level of initial wealth -and thus of K -as a higher level of capital induces a lower risk aversion. At stage 1, the monopolistic rm chooses its optimal level of additional capital K M by maximizing her net value V , anticipating the price p M (K). And we have K M = K * (p N ).
5 Social welfare and the need for capital regulation
In the symmetric case, social welfare SW is dened as the sum of consumer surplus CS and rms' prots (i.e. the rms' values net of additional capital) with 18 hal-00417573, version 1 -16 Sep 2009
The social welfare function is thus written as
In the case of the insurance market, it appears more realistic as prices are seldom control except through dierentiation while capital regulation is much more common 9 . We thus place ourselves in this second-best framework by supposing that government has direct control over the level of rms' capital but not on prices.
Proposition 5. Under assumptions (A1) to (A5), the level of capital K g that maximises social welfare is higher than K * .
Proof. If the benevolent and omniscient government only control K, then the rst order condition is dp
The marginal consumer surplus (T1) is positive. The second term (T2) is equal to 0 for K = K * . Thus assuming SW concave leads to K g > K * .
This result implies that imperfect competition leads to under-capitalization when compared to the social optimal capital. In our imperfect competition framework, note that higher capital requirements could lead to more competitive prices, as rms are less risk averse and potentially to a better social welfare. It is interesting to point out that this model leads to a rationale for capital regulation due to imperfect competition rather than standard solvency arguments. Note that control of capital choice reduces the interval of equilibrium prices available at the second stage of the game.
6 Concluding Remarks
The model extends Froot et al. (1993) 's framework by considering capital choices in a price competition setting for risk averse insurance rms. The principal result is the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibrium capital choices. Each level of capital leads to a continuum of Nash equilibrium prices of which we distinguish the one leading to rms' maximal value. We thus extends Wambach (1999)'s results, and provide a dierent analysis based on an associated risk premium: rms face 9 Note that it is equivalent for the government to play on the price or on the level of capital as they both interact, when considering that rms anticipate the maximum Nash price. do not support the hypothesis that external equity is more costly than internal equity but they underline that such results are to be taken with caution because recourse to external capital much more easy to estimate than retained earnings. Further study would be needed on this point.
Concerning the price of reinsurance, the results are in line with the latest studies on the catastrophe reinsurance market that shows that pricing far exceed competitive pricing in excess of loss contracts (Weiss and Chung, 2004; Froot, 2001; Froot and O'Connell, 2008) . In the present case of DARA rms, capital market imperfections as well as product market imperfections are integrated in the market price of risk.
Concerning the impact of the cost of capital on the pricing of risks in the reinsurance industry, Froot and O'Connell (2008) have given evidence of it, using reinsurance data (489 US-contracts over the period .
In the strand of insurance literature, capital constraints were at rst been taken as exogenous, for standard reason of regulation on the default risk -as it is the case in (Gron, 1990 (Matutes and Vives, 2000) . Each capital equilibrium leads to a continuum of Nash prices from which the maximum-value maximising price is exerted. A regulation on capital can avoid situations in which rms are under capitalised, leading to maximum Nash prices all the more high, and lower welfare. Capital regulation could then have a double impact: reduce rm insolvency as classically, bu also enhance competition.
Appendix
We give here the proof of the following propositions and corollaries.
A-Proof of Proposition 1
Let us note p m the monopoly price of the symmetric rms.
Lemma 2.
Proof (Weibull provides a similar proof in the case of convex costs of production):
Let us suppose that all rms price at p ∈ P N E , with p > p m . Firm i has a demand q i < Q(p). As Q(p) is continuous and lim p→+∞ Q(p) = 0.
By denition, as p m is the optimal monopoly price, EP (
As p > p m , thus the rm i can unilaterally deviate that enhances rm's value. Thus p is not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Wambach) : Under assumptions (A1) and (A3), if there is a price in the market such that the n rms have a value equal to their outside option, the value of any rm serving the whole market at this price is strictly smaller, formally:
Proof: See Wambach (1999) for Proof.
Lemma 3 leads to p ∈ P N E if and only if EP (w i 1 +π i (p,
Indeed, let us consider a deviation of rm i when all rms set a common price p ∈ P N E . If i raises her price, then it obtains no demand, as all the residuals rms meet the demand. If i lowers her price, she serves the whole market, and decreases its prot.
As P is concave, we have
rm has an optimal output between Q(p) n and Q. From (A4), we directly obtain that the competitive price is lower than p N . Lemma 2 leads to the conclusion that p N is lower than the maximal monopoly price. Let us consider p ∈ P N E . As p out = min(
Thus the value of the rms at p N is higher than her outside option.
B-Proof of Lemma 1 :
As p N i is the indierence price for rm i for serving the whole market or half of it, then EP w i
. As P is strictly increasing, this is equivalent for i, j tō
Let us compare at price p N i the expected value of rm j for serving the whole market and half of it. Assumption (A5) leads to:
Using Equation 14:
And as P is strictly increasing, the expected value to cover the whole market is higher than the expected value to cover half of it. Thus the indierence premium is lower for the less risk averse rm, that is the rm with higher level of initial capital.
Thus under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5), in the case of symmetric rms, w
The equation 14 implicitly dening p N allows for the continuity of p N compared to w 1 . Thus
C-Proof of Proposition 2:
Case p out max < p N min :
In the case where p out max < p N min , Lemma 1 leads to p ∈ P N E if and only if EP (
Let us suppose that p > p N min . The rm j that has the minimum Nash price p N min may lower the price and then catch the whole market. Thus p is not a Nash Equilibrium. Then let us consider a deviation of rm i when all rms set a common price p ∈ P N E . If i raises her price, then it obtains no demand, as all the residuals rms meet the demand. If i lowers her price, she serves the whole market, and decreases its prot. p denes then a Nash equilibrium
The extension to an oligopoly of n rms is immediate and when p out max > p N min .
However other Nash equilibrium may exists that consider less rms. In fact, for p < p out max , only n − 1 rms stay on the market. Let us dene for the remaining rms p n−1 max the maximum of the prices for which the rms are indierent between serving 1/n-1 th of the market or their outside option. If p n−1 max < p out max , there still exists a continuum of equilibrium prices for a n − 1 oligopoly. For m = 1..n − 1, we dene for the m rms remaining in the market 
E-Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an unilateral deviations of a rm i in the case of an n oligopoly of symmetric rms from the symmetric Nash equilibrium candidate (K,K). Under Assumption (A6) we only need to look at marginal deviations. We rst note that:
Increasing capital: K i >K.
If rm i chooses to increase its level of capital form the symmetric situation, it becomes the leader of the game, thus determines the market price p N (K i ). Considering Assumption (A6):
• ∀K < K * , V iLeader (K) > 0. HenceK < K * cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
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• ∀K ≥ K * , V iLeader (K) ≤ 0. Hence allK ≥ K * are candidates to be a Nash equilibrium.
Decreasing capital: K i <K.
If rm i chooses a lower level of capital than the other rms then the market price remains equal to p N (K), which is determined by the more capitalized rms. Considering the previous discussion:
• ∀K < K * , −V iT aker (K) = −V iLeader (K) − M C stratW (K) − M C stratD (K) ≤ 0,
Hence a marginal decrease in capital is not protable.
• ∀K + ≥K ≥ K * , −V iT aker (K) = −M B(K) + M C direct (K) ≤ 0 following assumption (A6b).
• ∀K >K, −V iT aker (K) = −M B(K) + M C direct (K) ≥ 0 thus a marginal decrease of capital is unilaterally protable.
We thus conclude that the symmetric couples of capital (K,K) are a Nash equilibrium for K * ≤K ≤ K + .
F-Proof of Proposition 4
Consider 2 rms l respectively h, with a low, resp. high, level of initial capital: w l 0 < w h 0 . If V lLeader follows (A6a) Assumption, then V lLeader is decreasing. For all K l , let us dene K h such that w l 0 + K l = w h 0 + K h , K l < K h . Thus V hLeader (K h ) = V lLeader (K l + w l 0 − w h 0 ), is also decreasing in K h . And V hLeader follows assumption (A6a). Both rms rach their maximum net value (for leader) for the same level of capital w l 0 + K * l = w h 0 + K * h where K * h < K * l .
We use the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 3. Consider rm h. For all K h ≤ K * h , rm h when being the leading rm has the interest for increasing her level of external capital. In this situation, rm l has always interest to increase as well her level of external capital up to K * l , where the Nash price is p N (w h 0 + K * h ). For all K * h ≤ K h ≤ K + h , rm h , as the leading rm, has no interest to increase her level of external capital, neither has she interest to lower it price-taking rm. For all K * l ≤ K l ≤ K + l , rm l as the leading rm has no interest to any deviation, when
h is the leading rm, as she is less risk averse. l chooses the level of external capital maximizing her net value as a follower, K < K + h , and rm h thus benets from lowering her level of capital. So for all K h > K M h , there are no Nash equilibrium.
G-Proof of Corollary 2:
We provide the proof of the corollary for the case of n symmetric rms. We consider n + 1 rms with the same initial wealth w 1 that compete on price. We note p N n the maximum Nash price of the competition of n of these rms, and p N n+1 the maximum Nash price for n + 1 rms. By denition
or EP (w i 1 +π i (p N n ,Q) n ) = EP (w i 1 +π i (p N n , Q)). The concavity of P leads to the concavity of EP in the output. Thus, for p N n , EP (w i 1 + n n+1π
Thus all rms prefer serving the whole market to (n+1) th of it at p N n . As all functions are continuous, a small decrease in price will not violate the condition of equilibrium for a market with n + 1 symmetric rms that is EP w i 1 +π i (p N n+1 ,
. Thus, using (A4), p N n+1 < p N n .
